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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
COMMENTS
LEGAL ETHICS-CONFLICTING INTERESTS-ATTORNEY ACTING AS
TRUSTEE AND COUNSEL FOR EXECUTOR
An attorney, appointed a trustee by the will of a testator,
rendered legal services to the executrix at her request. The at-
torney having completed the services, the executrix, with the ap-
proval of all residuary legatees, applied to the probate judge for
approval of the payment of the attorney's fees. The probate
judge took the position that the attorney was representing con-
flicting interests and denied payment. This decision, on appeal to
the circuit court, was reversed. On further appeal to the Supreme
Court of Missouri, held: circuit court decision affirmed. The
legal services rendered an estate in administration by an attor-
ney-trustee are chargeable against the estate and not merely
against the trust. Since there had been no separation of the trust
fund from the general fund at the time that the services were
rendered, the attorney had not violated Missouri Supreme Court
Rule 4.061 by representing conflicting interests.2
The court reasoned by analogy that since an executor may law-
fully act as a testamentary trustee, an attorney who acts as ad-
visor to an executor may also act as a testamentary trustee in the
same estate. That an executor may also serve as a testamentary
trustee is well settled,3 but with regard to the precise issue in the
instant case the authorities are silent. The inalogy of the court
is not completely convincing, however, because it deals with the
1. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4.06 is the same as Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association. The ap-
propriate part of the canon reads:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this section, a lawyer represents conflicting in-
terests, when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
2. In re Schield's Estate, 250 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. 1952).
3. Irvin v. Larson, 94 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1938); Goodsell v. McElroy
Bros. Co., 86 Conn. 402, 85 Atl. 509 (1912) ; State v. Beardsley, 77 Fla. 803,
82 So. 794 (1919); Sides v. Shewmaker, 188 Ga. 672, 4 S.E.2d 829 (1939);
Jones v. Broadbent, 21 Idaho 555, 123 Pac. 476 (1912); Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology v. Attorney General, 235 Mass. 288, 126 N.E. 521(1920) ; In re Shelton's Estate, 338 Mo. 1000, 93 S.W.2d 684 (1936) ; West v,
Bailey, 196 Mo. 517, 94 S.W. 273 (1906); State v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York, 82 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. App. 1935); In re Adams, 32 R.I. 41, 78
Atl. 524 (1911). See also 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 1837 (1935); Note,
Determining the Status of An Executor Who Is Also a T'ustee, 49 HARV. L.
REv. 116 (1936).
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question of whether any person may act as executor and trustee
in the same estate, and the problem in the principal case is one of
professional ethics.
Perhaps a closer analogy may be drawn to the decisions on the
question of whether an attorney who is an executor or trustee
may perform legal services for the estate or trust respectively
without representing conflicting interests. The older rule is that
he may not because it is one of the duties of the fiduciary to see
that no excessive or improper charge is made by persons em-
ployed by the estate, and the duties of the fiduciary in such a
situation are contrary to his personal interests in determining
the size of the fee.4 The modern trend, however, is toward per-
mitting the executor or trustee to receive fees as both fiduciary
and attorney.5 Some states have merely modified the older rule
by permitting such fiduciary a larger fee than an executor or
trustee who employs other counsel, which in effect is similar to
permitting fees for both services.6
In addition, it seems clear that in Missouri the trustee has no
duty to make an accounting and ascertain the net income, if any,
that might have accrued during the period of the executor's ad-
ministration 7-- except possibly when he knows or should know
of a misappropriation by the executor." The trustee's duties be-
gin when he accepts the trust and receives the corpus of the es-
tate from the executor, and consequently the trustee cannot be
held responsible for the actions of the executor. 9 The Missouri
court evidently believes that the accounting which must be made
to the probate court by the executor", is a sufficient check on him.
Thus, if the trustee is under no initial duty to ascertain the cor-
rectness of the executor's accounts, it is unlikely that an action
4. Willard v. Bassett, 27 Ill. 37 (1861); Mayer v. Galluchat, 6 Rihc. Eq.
(S.C.) 1 (1853); Broughton v. Broughton, 5 De G. M. & G. 160, 43 Eng.
Rep. 831 (1855).
5. Taylor v. Denny, 118 Md. 124, 84 Atl. 369 (1912) ; Shelton v. McHanet,
343 Mo. 119, 119 S.W.2d 951 (1938).
6. Nelson v. Schoonover, 89 Kan. 779, 132 Pac. 1183 (1913); Kentucky
National Bank v. Stone, 11 Ken. L. Rep. 948 (1890); Holding v. Allen, 150
Tenn. 669, 266 S.W. 772 (1924); Morris v. Ellis, 62 S.W. 250 (Tenn. Ch.
App. 1901) ; Noble v. Whitten, 38 Wash. 262, 80 Pac. 451 (1905).
7. Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S.W.2d 387 (1932); In re Holmes'
Estate, 328 Mo. 143, 40 S.W.2d 616 (1931).
8. See 3 BOaERT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1836.
9. Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S.W.2d 387 (1932); In re Holmes'
Estate, 328 Mo. 143, 40 S.W.2d 616 (1931).
10. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 465.030, 465.130 (1949).
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would arise in which the executor and the trustee would be op-
posing parties.
These considerations inlicate the validity of the court's de-
cision on the facts of the principal case. Other factors, however,
point to at least two situations where a conflict of interest could
arise in such a factual setting. It has been stated that the trustee
does have a duty to take over the assets from the executor as soon
as the terms of the will and the probate law allow and will be
liable to the trust beneficiaries if he permits the executor to re-
tain possession longer than is required for the closing up of the
estate and if a loss thereby results.1' This rule might put the
trustee under an obligation to sue the executor, in which case
the attorney-trustee in the instant case would find himself rep-
resenting conflicting interests. Furthermore, it has been held
that where the trustee knows or should reasonably know that the
executor has misappropriated the funds of the estate, the trustee
owes the beneficiary a duty to sue the executor for damages for
failure to deliver over to the trust the proper amount and kind of
property.12 Here again there is a possibility of conflict, for there
can be little doubt that the attorney-trustee in the principal case
would be on notice of any misappropriation of funds made by the
executrix since he had advised her in the administration of the
estate. The fact that a conflict might arise was admitted in the
principal case but that possibility was dismissed with the state-
ment that the mere fact of a possibility of conflict was beside the
point.
The principal case is consistent with the trend toward relaxa-
tion of the harshness of the rule against representing conflicting
interests.1 3 Morever, in the light of practicality, the court's de-
cision that the mere fact of a possibility of representing conflict-
ing interests should not be sufficient to implicate an attorney un-
der Rule 4.06 seems logical, for it is always possible for two of
an attorney's clients to become opposing parties in a future suit.
Should an actual controversy arise between them, the attorney
could and should remove himself from the suit at that time. This
reasoning suggests the soundness of the ruling in the principal
case.
11. See 3 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3 at 1836.
12. I re Rosenfeldt's Will, 185 Minn. 425, 241 N.W. 573 (1932) ; accord,
In re Kline's Estate, 280 Pa. 41, 124 AtI. 280 (1924).
13. See notes 4, 5, 6 supra.
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